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Abstract 
Previous studies have found that false memories and false beliefs of childhood experiences 
can have attitudinal consequences.  Previous studies have, however, focused exclusively on 
explicit attitude measures without exploring whether implicit attitudes are similarly affected.  
Using a false feedback/imagination inflation paradigm, false memories and beliefs of 
enjoying a certain food as a child were elicited in participants, and their effects were assessed 
using both explicit attitude measures (self-report questionnaires) and implicit measures (a 
Single-Target Implicit Association Test).  Positive changes in explicit attitudes were observed 
both in participants with false memories and participants with false beliefs. In contrast, only 
participants with false memories exhibited more positive implicit attitudes.  The findings are 
discussed in terms of theories of explicit and implicit attitudes.  
Keywords: false memories, false beliefs, explicit attitudes, implicit attitudes, false-
feedback. 
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False memories, But Not False Beliefs, Affect Implicit Attitudes For Food Preferences 
1. Introduction 
Since the pioneering work of Bartlett (1932), it has been known that human memory 
involves reconstructive processes that give rise to false memories and false beliefs of events that 
did not occur. Recently, researchers have begun to focus on the behavioural consequences of 
false memories and beliefs. For example, Bernstein, Laney, Morris and Loftus (2005) found 
that aversions to particular foods can be created by implanting a false memory or false belief 
that, as a child, one was sick after eating the food. False memories and beliefs have also been 
found to have positive effects on attitudes towards certain foods. For example, Laney, Morris, 
Bernstein, Wakefield, and Loftus (2008) induced positive attitudes towards asparagus by 
implanting the false suggestion that participants had enjoyed asparagus the first time they 
tried it.  
These studies, and others (see Bernstein, Pernat, & Loftus, 2011, for a review), 
demonstrate that false memories and beliefs can have significant effects on our attitudes.  A 
recent meta-analysis by Bernstein, Scoboria and Arnold (2015) of studies eliciting false 
memories and beliefs of childhood food-related events found that false beliefs (i.e. a belief in 
the event’s occurrence without accompanying recollective experience) and false memories 
(belief in the event’s occurrence with accompanying recollective experience) resulted in 
roughly equivalent changes in attitude measures, leading the researchers to conclude that 
false autobiographical belief (a common factor in both false memories and false beliefs) is the 
driving factor behind attitude change. A limitation of these studies, however, is that they have 
focussed exclusively on the effects of false memories and beliefs on explicit attitudes.  Many 
contemporary models of social cognition acknowledge the importance of both explicit and 
implicit attitudes in determining behaviour (e.g., Fazio, 1990; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 
2000).  Whereas explicit attitudes are considered to be consciously controlled, rational, and 
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deliberative, implicit attitudes are assumed to be activated automatically outside conscious 
awareness.  Implicit attitudes are thought to reflect associations in memory between an 
item/concept and an attribute, and are typically measured through some form of response-
latency based paradigm (see Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014 for a review of the most commonly 
used measures).  An advantage of this type of measure is that it circumvents the potential for 
demand characteristics (Fazio & Olson, 2003); an issue which has been a common critique of 
studies investigating the attitudinal consequences of false memories and beliefs (Laney, 
Kaasa, et al., 2008).  There is also strong evidence that implicit attitude measures predict a 
significant amount of variance, unique from that which is predicted by explicit attitude 
measures, in a wide range of behaviours (see Jost et al., 2009 for a review).  A meta-analysis 
by Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhllman, and Banaji (2009) found that the greater the convergence 
of explicit and implicit attitude measures, the greater their predictive value of subsequent 
behaviour.  Given the body of evidence from the social psychological literature on the 
importance of implicit attitudes in social cognition, the aim of the current study was to 
determine whether false memories and beliefs have implicit attitudinal effects. 
Since implicit attitudes are thought to represent associations in memory that form over 
time, the extent to which they can be modified by brief, explicit interventions (as would be 
the case in a typical laboratory study) could be considered questionable.  There is, however, 
evidence that implicit attitudes can be modified through mental imagery exercises.  For 
example, Blair, Ma, and Lenton (2001) found that participants who engaged in counter-
stereotypic mental imagery subsequently exhibited weaker implicit stereotypes.  Blair et al. 
argued that imagery was able to affect implicit attitudes because it increased the accessibility 
of cognitive representations relevant to the attitude object in memory consistent with the 
imagined scenario.  Markland, Hall, Duncan, & Simatovic (2015) recently revived this idea 
and found that guided mental imagery of a positive exercise-related experience resulted in 
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more positive implicit attitudes towards exercise. Markland et al. interpreted their results 
within the framework of Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s (2006) Associative and Propositional 
Evaluation (APE) model. This model suggests that implicit attitude change results from a 
change in the underlying associative activations triggered upon presentation of the attitude 
object, which can be dependent on immediately available contextual cues (such as those 
which might be provided by an imagery exercise).   
Following this logic, Markland et al. (2015) suggested that detailed imagery exercises 
can affect implicit attitudes by creating associations between the attitude object and 
positively-valenced details generated during imagination (e.g. positive sensory or affective 
details).  In recent years, a line of research has emerged which has emphasised the similarities 
between episodic memory of past events and imagination of hypothetical future events, both 
of which can be episodic in nature, containing rich details specific to time and place (Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007).  There is strong evidence that re-experiencing past events via 
episodic memory and pre-experiencing hypothetical events via imagination have strong 
phenomenological similarities (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2006; Szpunar & 
McDermott, 2008), as well as shared neural substrates (see Schacter et al., 2012, for a 
review).  Given these similarities, it seems plausible that a false episodic memory may be 
sufficient to affect implicit attitudes via the same mechanisms as guided imagination 
exercises.  However, it seems unlikely that a false belief of a positive experience involving an 
attitude object without accompanying recollective experience would generate the detail 
necessary to affect underlying associative activations generated upon presentation of the 
attitude object (and therefore be insufficient to elicit implicit attitude change).   
In sum, the current study is the first to address the issue of whether false memories 
and beliefs can affect implicit attitudes towards an object as well as explicit attitudes.  A 
false-feedback paradigm similar to that used in Laney, Morris, et al. (2008) was utilised, with 
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some procedural modifications designed to maximize usable data and the number of reported 
false memories and beliefs within the experimental group (see Method section).  The false 
suggestion given to the experimental group was that they had enjoyed a certain food the first 
time they tried it as a child.  It was hypothesised that those who formed a false memory or 
belief of enjoying the food the first time they tried it would report more preferential explicit 
attitudes towards the attitude object post-suggestion than pre-suggestion.  With regards to 
implicit attitudes, it was hypothesised that participants with a false memory (but not 
necessarily those with a false belief only) would exhibit significantly more positive implicit 
attitudes towards the relevant attitude object. 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
The overall sample consisted of 120 undergraduate students (101 female, 19 male) at 
the University of Hull, U.K., who participated in return for course credit or payment.  Overall 
sample size was comparable to that of other experiments using a similar paradigm (Clifasefi, 
Bernstein, Mantonakis, & Loftus, 2013; Laney, Morris, et al., 2008).  The subdivision of the 
Suggestion group (the experimental group who received the false suggestion of loving a 
certain food the first time they tried it) in the analyses means that a far higher number of 
Suggestion group participants are needed relative to control participants. Therefore, 
allocation of participants to groups was only partially random.  The majority of participants 
(n = 96) were randomly assigned to either the Suggestion or control group at a ratio of two 
Suggestion group participants to one control participant.  Once a sufficient number of control 
participants had been recruited for analyses (n = 32), all subsequent participants (n = 24) 
were allocated to the Suggestion group.  The final number of participants in the false 
suggestion group was 88, with 32 in the control condition.  Because the study was 
exclusively interested in false memories and beliefs, participants were only included in 
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analyses if they indicated low baseline confidence in the occurrence of a potential false 
suggestion event (see Materials and Procedure sections for further details).  After applying 
this exclusion criterion, there were 75 suggestion group participants and 31 control 
participants, giving a functional overall size for this study of n =106.  This sample was made 
up of 88 females and 18 males, with a mean age of 21.88 years (SD = 6.33).  Up to five 
participants were tested simultaneously in each experimental session. 
2.2 Design 
 A mixed design was employed in which session (Session 1 / pre-suggestion vs 
Session 2 / post-suggestion) served as a within-subjects factor, with group serving as a 
between-subjects factor.  For initial analyses of false memory/belief formation, the between-
subjects group factor refers to the false Suggestion group vs the control group.  In later stages 
of analyses, the Suggestion group is subdivided into “Believers” and “Non-Believers”, with 
the Believers subgroup then being further subdivided in order to compare data for those who 
formed a false memory and those who formed a false belief only. 
The dependent variables differed slightly from previous studies.  In past studies, the 
false suggestion given to the experimental group was identical for each participant; 
subsequently, the DV has always been attitude measures relating to the attitude object in the 
false suggestion (e.g., the false suggestion ‘You loved asparagus as a child’ and the 
subsequent DV of attitudes towards asparagus in Laney, Morris, et al., 2008).  However, a 
problem with this approach is that all participants who indicate high baseline confidence in 
the false suggestion item need to be excluded from analyses (since the studies are interested 
exclusively in false memories).  In an attempt to maximise the amount of usable data, the 
current study measured participants’ baseline confidence that they had loved a series of 
different foods the first time they tried them, including four potential critical items which 
could later be incorporated into the false suggestions given to the experimental group (see 
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Procedure section for more details on item allocation and how they were incorporated into 
false suggestions).  Subsequently, the DVs for each participant are the explicit and implicit 
attitude measures pertaining to their specific critical item.    
2.3 Materials 
This study utilised pen-and-paper questionnaires similar to those used by Laney, 
Morris, et al. (2008), but with several changes designed to improve the efficiency of the 
experimental design in terms of data utilisation as well as increasing the likelihood of 
Suggestion group participants forming false memories.  The first session contained eight brief 
questionnaires.  One of these was the “Food History Inventory” (FHI) which lists a series of 
24 food related events (e.g. “ate ice cream at the seaside”, “helped your parents prepare a 
meal”) and asks the participant to rate on a 1-8 scale how confident they are that the event 
occurred to them before the age of 12.  The critical item which would form the basis of the 
false suggestion in Session 2 was contained within this questionnaire.  One key change to this 
questionnaire which differentiates it from that used in Laney, Morris, et al. was that instead of 
the questionnaire containing a singular critical item (such as “You loved asparagus the first 
time you tried it”), a second section was added to the questionnaire which asked the 
participants to rate how confident they were (on the same 1-8 scale) that they had loved a 
series of foods the first time they tried them.  Within this list of 20 different foods were four 
potential critical items; broccoli, carrots, green beans, and cauliflower.   
Session 1 also contained the “Restaurant Questionnaire” which asked participants to 
imagine they were in a restaurant for a special dinner and then assessed (on a 1-8 scale) how 
likely they were to order a series of 32 dishes assuming price was no object.  Included within 
this list were four different dishes which predominantly featured the critical items; ‘stir-fried 
broccoli’, ‘carrot salad’, ‘buttered green beans’ and ‘roasted cauliflower salad’.  There was 
also a ‘Food Preferences’ questionnaire which asked participants to rate their general 
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preference for a series of 64 different food items (including the four potential critical items) 
on a 1-8 scale.  Participants also completed five brief personality questionnaires to gather 
individual differences data for a related study and to help maintain the cover story that the 
study investigating the relationship between food preferences and personality.  
The second session contained repeats of the FHI, Restaurant and Food Preferences 
questionnaires, as well as a “feedback” questionnaire.  This questionnaire, administered at the 
start of the session, claimed that it was based on the individual participant’s data from the 
first session, listing four events from the FHI questionnaire that they had ostensibly indicated 
they were confident had happened to them.  For the Suggestion group, only three of the items 
were events they had confirmed in their Session 1 responses. The fourth was a statement that 
they loved their critical food item the first time they tried it.  For control participants, all four 
items were events that the participant had confirmed in their Session 1 responses.   
The feedback questionnaire then instructed participants to elaborate on two of the 
events by imagining themselves currently at the scene in which the event may have taken 
place with as much detail as possible, before listing “any information on sensory details 
(sights, sounds, etc), thoughts or feelings” associated with the event (for Suggestion group 
participants, one of these events was always the suggestion regarding the critical item).  
Participants were instructed to attempt to list “at least 3 details”.  After doing this, they were 
asked to rate on a 1-8 scale how vividly they were able to imagine the event, followed by the 
filler question regarding the extent to which they feel this event influenced their adult 
personality (to maintain the cover story that the experiment is concerned with the relationship 
between food attitudes and personality).  This feedback questionnaire contained two key 
alterations from that used in Laney, Morris, et al. (2008). The first change was that 
participants were given feedback events specifically tailored to them based on their Session 1 
answers (three of the four events for the Suggestion group, all four events for the control 
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group), whereas Laney, Morris, et al. provided every participant with filler events which they 
assumed would be true of most people.  The aim of this change was to increase the credibility 
of the false suggestion. It has previously been found that participants are more likely to form 
a false memory of an event if the false suggestion contains personally relevant information 
(Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007), therefore incorporating events into the false feedback which 
participants had indicated they were confident had happened to them may increase feedback 
credibility and potentially boost false memory rates.   
The second change to the feedback questionnaire was the imagination instructions.  
Laney, Morris, et al. (2008) asked participants to imagine the setting in which two of the 
feedback events might have occurred (one of which was the false suggestion event for 
experimental group participants) before giving brief details of the place of the event and who 
they may have been with.  In the current experiment, these instructions were adapted to 
encourage more in-depth imagination of the false suggestion event.  Instructions were 
adapted from Grilli and Glisky’s (2010) “self-imagining” technique, which was found to 
significantly increase recollection of imagined experiences.  Participants were instructed to 
imagine themselves at the scene in which the experience may have occurred in as much detail 
as possible before listing any information on sensory details, thoughts or feelings associated 
with the event.  Participants were encouraged to try and generate at least 3 or 4 details.  It was 
hoped that these self-imagining instructions would be more effective at boosting false 
memory rates through imagination inflation than those used by Laney, Morris, et al. 
Also included in Session 2 was a ‘Food Costs’ questionnaire. This was similar to that 
used in Laney, Morris, et al. (2008) and asked participants to select the maximum price that 
they would pay for 21 different food items (including the four critical items) in a supermarket 
setting.  Finally, a ‘Memory or Belief’ questionnaire was included, which listed three FHI 
events (one of which, for all participants, was that they loved their critical item the first time 
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they tried it) and asked participants to indicate whether they had a specific memory of the 
event, a belief that the event occurred but no specific memory of it, or were absolutely certain 
that the event did not occur. If participants reported a memory of the event, they were 
encouraged to list as much detail of the memory as possible.  In the case of belief only, they 
were asked to write why they thought the event had happened to them.  If they were sure that 
the event did not happen, they were asked to write why they were sure this was the case.  
To measure implicit attitudes, the Single-Target Implicit Association Test (ST-IAT) 
developed by Karpinski and Steinman (2006) was employed.  The ST-IAT is similar to the 
standard Implicit Association Test procedure (IAT) developed by Greenwald, McGhee, 
Schwartz, and Jordan (1998) in that it is based on participants’ response times in categorising 
pictures or words representing an attitude object when paired with positively or negatively 
valenced stimuli (usually words), with the underlying assumption that positive implicit 
attitudes towards the attitude object should facilitate faster response times when the object is 
paired with positively valenced stimuli than when the object is paired with negatively 
valenced stimuli.  However, the standard IAT is only effective for measuring the implicit 
attitudes towards one attitude object relative to another attitude object (e.g., Democrats vs 
Republicans).  The key feature that distinguishes the ST-IAT from the standard IAT is that a 
comparison category is not necessary, and therefore implicit attitudes measures are more 
representative of the automatic evaluation of a single object, rather than being relative to an 
opposing object.  The ST-IAT procedure used (see Procedure section for details) was based 
on that of Bluemke and Friese (2008), who over two studies containing several thousand 
participants found that the test displayed adequate construct and discriminant validity in 
measuring implicit attitudes to the related but distinct concepts of various political parties.  
The valenced stimuli used were largely similar, whilst the political party stimuli used by 
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Bluemke and Friese were replaced with pictorial stimuli of the four critical food items (one 
ST-IAT for each critical item). 
2.4 Procedure 
2.4.1 Session 1.  
As in Laney, Morris, et al. (2008), participants were falsely informed that they would 
be participating in a study investigating the relationship between food preferences and 
personality.  Participants completed the FHI, Restaurant and Food Preference questionnaires, 
interspersed with the five measures of individual differences mentioned in the Materials 
section.  Participants were randomly assigned to the Suggestion or Control groups, although 
for aforementioned reasons a 2:1 ratio of Suggestion to Control participants was maintained, 
and when a sufficient number of control participants for analysis had been tested, all 
participants were automatically assigned to the Suggestion group.  Participants were then 
assigned a critical food item which they indicated low baseline confidence in enjoying the 
first time they tried it (a rating of 4 or less for that item on the Session 1 FHI).  When 
multiple potential critical items were available, preference was given to an item which also 
had low explicit attitude ratings on the Restaurant and Preference questionnaires.  Where 
multiple items were available which also matched this attitudinal criterion, preference was 
given to the item which had currently been assigned to the fewest participants (with the aim 
of balancing the number of participants assigned to each item as far as possible).  In the event 
that a participant gave a Session 1 FHI rating of greater than 4 for all potential critical items, 
they were assigned whichever critical item they had rated lowest, and where multiple options 
were rated similarly, they were assigned the critical item which had currently been assigned 
to the fewest participants (although as previously mentioned, participants who gave a Session 
1 FHI rating of greater than 4 for all four potential critical items were excluded from 
analyses, since low baseline confidence in the false suggestion event was required).   
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2.4.2 Session 2.  
Session 2 took place approximately one week after Session 1. Suggestion group 
participants received the false feedback questionnaire, including the false suggestion that they 
had loved their specific critical item the first time they tried it, as well as three filler events 
which they had indicated they were confident had happened to them based on their Session 1 
answers (FHI rating of 6 or higher).  Control group participants received the same 
questionnaires, except with a fourth filler item instead of a false suggestion regarding their 
critical item.  From this point onwards, the questionnaires were identical for both groups.  
The false feedback questionnaire was followed by the FHI, Restaurant, Food Preferences, 
Food Costs and Memory or Belief questionnaires. 
After the questionnaires were completed, participants proceeded with the ST-IATs, 
which were run using E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).  Participants 
were instructed to categorise target category stimuli (pictures of a certain food) and 
evaluative stimuli (positive or negative words) as quickly and accurately as possible using 
two different categorisation keys on the keyboard (Z and M).  Before each block of trials, 
participants were informed which key would represent each category, and the categories 
remained on screen in the top left (Z key) and top right (M key) corners of the screen during 
the categorisation task as a reminder. The first block of trials was a training block, in which 
only evaluative stimuli were presented.  This was followed by the first ST-IAT, in which 
stimuli for the first target and positive words were categorised under the Z key whilst 
negative words were categorised with the M key.  This initial block was followed by a 
“reversed” block, in which positive words were mapped to the Z key, whilst target stimuli 
and negative words were mapped to the M key.  This procedure was repeated for each of the 
remaining three target items, with positive and negative words swapping category keys each 
time.  The order in which each of the four foods was presented was counterbalanced between 
©2019, Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
FALSE MEMORIES AFFECT IMPLICIT ATTITUDES                                       14 
 
participants.  The sides on which target and evaluative stimuli were first presented (Z or M 
keys) were also counterbalanced, whilst maintaining that target stimuli and positive words 
were always paired together first.  This created 8 different orders in which stimuli were 
presented, balanced between participants.  
Evaluative stimuli consisted of five unambiguously positive and five unambiguously 
negative words, presented in 24pt black font against a white background in the centre of the 
screen.  The target category stimuli consisted of five different 700x500 resolution pictures of 
the appropriate foods, displayed uncooked on white plates.  For each block of trials, all 
stimuli were presented at least twice, and in a randomised order.  For the initial evaluative 
block, a total of 20 evaluative stimuli were presented (10 positive, 10 negative).  For each of 
the following initial and reversed blocks, a total of 35 stimuli were presented; 10 being the 
pictures of the target food, 10 being the words from the evaluative category which was 
currently sharing a categorisation key with the target food, and 15 being the words from the 
evaluative category which was not currently sharing a categorisation key with the target food.  
Stimuli remained on screen until a categorisation response was received.  The interstimulus 
interval after responses was 300ms, with incorrect responses triggering the word ‘Error’ 
which was presented in bold, red 24pt text in the centre of the screen.  After each block of 
trials, participants were instructed to take a self-paced rest if they were fatigued, as well as 
being given the new categorisation instructions for the next block of trials which they started 
whenever they were ready.  After all ST-IATs were completed, participants were thanked and 
fully debriefed. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Allocation of False Suggestion Items 
Exclusion criteria were applied to ensure that analyses were restricted to participants 
for whom a false suggestion could be generated. Any participants who indicated that they 
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were confident they had loved all four of the potential false suggestion items (FHI ratings of 
5 or more for each one) were excluded from analysis.  Fourteen participants were excluded 
on this basis, giving a functional N of 106 (75 Suggestion group participants and 31 controls).  
The remaining participants were allocated a critical false suggestion item based on criteria 
discussed in the Procedure section.  A cross-tabulation showing the numbers of participants 
assigned to each potential false suggestion item split by group can be found in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  
Cross-tabulation of false suggestion item by group allocation. 
 False Suggestion Item 
Group Broccoli Green Beans Cauliflower Carrots 
Control 11 (35.5%) 13 (41.9%) 4 (12.9%) 3 (9.7%) 
Suggestion 29 (38.7%) 17 (22.7%) 26 (34.7%) 3 (4%) 
 
 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that there were no significant 
differences between the four false suggestion items in pre-suggestion attitudinal measures 
confidence in the false suggestion event, and the extent to which these measures changed 
post-suggestion.  A series of one-way ANOVAs found no main effect of false suggestion 
item on Session 1 FHI, Restaurant or Preferences scores, or on the level of post-suggestion 
change in these measures (all p > .05).  These results suggested that all four false suggestion 
items were suitable for grouping together into a single DV in subsequent analyses. 
3.2 Were False Memories and False Beliefs Elicited? 
FHI and Memory or Belief questionnaires were analysed to assess whether giving 
participants a false suggestion of loving their relevant critical food item was successful in 
eliciting false memories and beliefs of this event.  The Suggestion and Control groups both 
gave similar pre-suggestion confidence ratings for the false suggestion item (see Fig. 1); the 
Suggestion group gave a mean rating of 2.01 (SD = 1.11) whilst the control group gave a 
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rating of 2.23 (SD = 1.20).  However, after the false feedback was given at the start of 
Session 2, Suggestion group participants increased their ratings by an average of 3.39 points 
to a mean of 5.40 (SD = 2.54), whilst the ratings of control participants who did not receive 
the false suggestion at the start of Session 2 reported very similar level ratings as in Session 1 
(M = 2.29, SD = 1.19). 
 
Fig. 1. Mean FHI confidence ratings that participants loved their critical false 
suggestion item the first time they tried it, both in Session 1 (pre-suggestion) and 
Session 2 (post-suggestion).  Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
A 2x2 mixed-design ANOVA (with group as the between-subjects factor and session 
as the within-subjects factor) found a significant main effect of group on confidence ratings, 
F(1, 104) = 21.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, a significant main effect of session, F(1, 104) = 69.37, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .40, and a significant group x session interaction, F(1, 104) = 64.28, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .38.  Post-hoc paired samples t-tests (with a Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of .025) 
found that Session 2 (post-suggestion) FHI ratings were significantly higher than Session 1 
(pre-suggestion) ratings for the Suggestion group, t(74) = 13.05, p < .001, whilst control 
group ratings did not significantly differ between sessions, t(30) = .465, p = .645.  
Analysis of the Memory or Belief questionnaire revealed that, within the Suggestion 
group, 27 participants (36%) reported a false memory of the false suggestion event at the end 
of the Session 2 questionnaires, whilst an additional 26 (34.7%) reported a false belief only 
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and 22 (29.3%) reported that they were positive that the event did not happen.  Within the 
control group, no participants reported a false memory, 3 (9.7%) reported a false belief, and 
28 (90.3%) were positive that the event did not happen.  A Pearson’s chi square test found 
that participants’ likelihood of reporting a false memory, false belief, or being positive that 
the event did not happen differed significantly as a function of group, χ2(2, n = 106) = 33.46, 
p < .001.  Combined with the FHI data, these results indicate that false memories and beliefs 
were sufficiently generated within the Suggestion group.   
3.3 Explicit Attitudinal Consequences of False Memories and Beliefs (Believers vs Non-
Believers vs Controls). 
Explicit attitudinal consequences of false memories and beliefs were initially 
compared between participants who formed either a false memory or a false belief 
(“Believers”), participants who received the false suggestion but did not form a false memory 
or belief (“Non-believers”) and control participants.  The criteria for determining whether a 
participant formed a false memory or false belief was the same as that used in Laney, Morris, 
et al. (2008). Specifically, any participants remaining after the initial exclusion criteria 
(confidence rating of 4 or lower for their false suggestion item on the FHI) who received the 
false suggestion at the beginning of Session 2 and subsequently went on to report a higher 
rating for the relevant FHI item than they did in Session 1 as well as reporting a memory or 
belief of the false suggestion event in the Memory or Belief questionnaire.  Any Suggestion 
group participants who did not meet the criteria to be classified as Believers were classified 
as Non-Believers.  Of the 75 Suggestion group participants remaining after the initial FHI 
exclusion criteria was applied, 52 (69.33%) met the criteria to be classified as Believers, with 
the remaining 23 (30.66%) classified as Non-Believers.  Data for these subgroups were 
compared with the 31 control participants who met the initial FHI criteria. 
3.3.1 Restaurant questionnaire.   
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Participants’ desire to eat a dish containing their relevant food in a restaurant setting 
was assessed on a 1-8 scale.  The mean ratings for each subgroup of participants across both 
sessions are displayed in Fig. 2.  In Session 1, participants who would go on to be classified 
as ‘Believers’ gave a mean rating of 3.38 (SD = 2.18), those who would later be classified as 
‘non-believers’ gave a mean rating of 2.13 (SD = .1.89) and control participants gave a mean 
rating of 2.87 (SD = 2.09).  In Session 2 (post feedback), believers increased their mean 
rating to 5.12 (SD = 2.52), whilst non-believers’ ratings increased only marginally to 2.26 
(SD = 1.82), and control participants’ ratings decreased marginally to 2.68 (SD = 1.85). 
 
Fig. 2. Mean likelihood of ordering critical food-based dish in a restaurant 
setting (‘Restaurant Questionnaire Scores’) for Believers, Non-Believers and 
Control participants in Session 1 (pre-suggestion) and Session 2 (post-
suggestion).  Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
A 3x2 mixed ANOVA was carried out to assess whether restaurant questionnaire 
ratings differed significantly as a function of session (Session 1 vs Session 2, within-subjects 
factor) and group (Believers vs Non-Believers vs Controls, between-subjects factor).  
Significant main effects were found for Session, F(1, 103) = 8.03, p = .006, ηp2 = .07, and 
Group, F(2, 103) = 11.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, as well as a significant Session x Group 
interaction, F(2, 103) = 11.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .19.  Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests 
(with an adjusted alpha level of .0167) revealed that Session 1 and Session 2 ratings did not 
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differ significantly for non-believers (p = .672) and controls (p = .351), whilst for believers, 
Session 2 ratings were found to be significantly higher than Session 1 ratings, t(51) = 5.23, p 
< .001. 
3.3.2 Food preferences questionnaire.   
This questionnaire measured participants’ general preference for their false suggestion 
item (as well as 63 other filler items) on a 1-8 scale, and was completed both pre-feedback 
(Session 1) and post-feedback (Session 2).  The mean ratings for each subgroup are displayed 
in Fig. 3.   
 
Fig. 3.  Mean ratings of general preference for the critical food item given in 
both Session 1 (pre-suggestion) and Session 2 (post-suggestion) for Believers, 
Non-Believers and Controls.  Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
 
In Session 1, participants who would later be classified as Believers gave their critical 
items a mean preference rating of 3.73 (SD = 2.13), participants later classified as Non-
Believers gave a mean rating of 2.35 (SD = 2.04), and controls gave a mean rating of 3.32 
(SD = 2.24).  In Session 2, the mean preference rating given by believers increased to 5.98 
(SD = 2.05), whilst mean ratings for non-believers (M = 2.26, SD = 1.71) and controls (M = 
3.26, SD = 2.13) remained highly similar to their pre-feedback scores.  A 3x2 mixed ANOVA 
with group (Believers vs Non-Believers vs Controls) as the between-subjects factor and 
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session (Session 1 vs Session 2) as the within-subjects factor revealed significant main effects 
of both group, F(2, 103) = 17.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .25, and session, F(1, 103) = 12.79, p = 
.001, ηp2 = .11, with a significant group x session interaction, F(2, 103) = 19.73, p < .001, ηp2 
= .28.  Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc paired-samples t-tests (with an adjusted alpha level of 
.0167) were carried out to assess the differences in preference ratings between Session 1 and 
Session 2 for each of the subgroups.  Whilst no significant differences were found between 
Session 1 and Session 2 preference ratings for non-believers (p = .822) and controls (p = 
.782), Session 2 preference ratings were found to be significantly higher than Session 1 
ratings for believers, t(51) = 7.32, p < .001.  
3.3.3 Food costs questionnaire.   
This questionnaire was only administered in Session 2, and the unequal intervals 
meant that a non-parametric test was used to analyse differences between groups.  A Kruskal-
Wallis H test that there was a significant difference between groups in the maximum amount 
they were willing to pay for their relevant food, χ2 = 9.70, p = .008, with mean rank scores of 
61.93 for believers, 41 for non-believers and 46.53 for controls.  Bonferroni-corrected Mann-
Whitney U (with an adjusted alpha level of .025) tests revealed that believers gave 
significantly higher ratings than controls, z = 2.30, p = .021, and non-believers, z = 2.70, p = 
.007.   
3.4 Explicit Attitudinal Consequences of False Memories and Beliefs (Memories vs 
Beliefs vs Controls). 
To assess the differences in explicit attitudinal consequences of false memories and 
false beliefs only, the subgroup of ‘believers’ was further subdivided into those who reported 
a false memory of the false suggestion event in the Memory or Belief questionnaire, and 
those who reported a false belief only with no specific memory.  The 3 control group 
participants who claimed to have a belief of the false suggestion event despite not having 
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received the false suggestion in their feedback were treated as controls for these analyses 
rather than as participants having false beliefs.  After applying this criterion, there were 27 
participants who were classified as having a false memory and 25 who were classified as 
having a false belief, as well as the 31 control participants.  Thus, the functional n for this set 
of analyses was 83. 
3.4.1 Restaurant questionnaire.   
The mean scores for the Restaurant questionnaire across both sessions is displayed in 
Fig. 4.  In Session 1, those who later formed a false memory of the false suggestion event 
gave a mean rating of 3.26 (SD = 2.30), those who later formed a false belief only gave a 
mean rating of 3.52 (SD = 2.08) and controls gave a mean rating of 2.87 (SD = 2.09).  In 
Session 2 (post-feedback), participants who later reported a false memory increased their 
mean rating to 5.30 (SD = 2.45), those who reported a false belief increased their mean rating 
to 4.92 (SD = 2.63), and the mean rating of controls decreased slightly to 2.68 (SD = 1.85). 
 
Fig. 4.  Mean likelihood of ordering critical-food based dish in a restaurant 
setting in Session 1 (pre-suggestion) and Session 2 (post-suggestion) for 
participants who reported a false memory of the false suggestion event, a false 
belief of the event only, and control participants.  Error bars standard error of the 
mean.  
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A 3x2 mixed ANOVA using session as the within-subjects variable and group 
(memory vs belief vs control) as the between-subjects variable found a significant main effect 
of session, F(1, 80) = 23.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, a significant main effect of group, F(2, 80) = 
5.33, p = .007, ηp2 = .12, and a significant group x session interaction, F(2, 80) = 9.54, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .19.  Bonferroni corrected post-hoc (with an adjusted alpha level of .0167) t-tests 
revealed that Session 2 ratings were significantly higher than Session 1 ratings for those with 
a false memory, t(26) = 4.51, p < .001, and those with a false belief, t(24) = 2.88, p = .008, 
but did not significantly differ for controls (p = .672).  Ratings for those with a false memory 
and those with a false belief only did not significantly differ at either Session 1 (p = 1.00) or 
Session 2 (p = 1.00).   
3.4.2 Food preferences questionnaire.   
Mean ratings given for the general preferences questionnaire are displayed in Fig. 5.  
In Session 1, those who would later reported a false memory of the false suggestion event 
gave a mean rating of 3.89 (SD = 2.21), those who would later report a false belief gave a 
mean rating of 3.56 (SD = 2.08) and control participants gave a mean rating of 3.32 (SD = 
2.24).  In Session 2, those who would report a false memory increased their mean rating to 
6.37 (SD = 1.98), those who reported a false belief increased their rating to 5.56 (SD = 2.08) 
and control participants decreased their mean rating marginally to 3.26 (SD = 2.13).   
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Fig. 5. Mean general preference ratings for critical food items in Session 1 (pre-
suggestion) and Session 2 (post-suggestion) given by those who reported a false 
memory of the false suggestion event, those who reported a false belief, and 
control participants.  Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
A 3x2 mixed ANOVA with session as the within-subjects factor and group (memories 
vs beliefs vs controls) as the between-subjects factor found a significant main effect of 
session on preference ratings, F(1, 80) = 48.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .38, a significant main effect 
of group, F(2, 80) = 7.20, p = .001, ηp2 = .15, and a significant group x session interaction, 
F(2, 80) = 14.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .27.  As for the Restaurant Questionnaire results, 
Bonferroni-corrected (with an adjusted alpha level of .0167), post-hoc, paired samples t-tests 
revealed that whilst ratings did not differ significantly between sessions for control 
participants (p = .782), Session 2 ratings were significantly higher in Session 2 than in 
Session 1 for those who reported a false memory, t(26) = 5.58, p < .001, and those who 
reported a false belief, t(24) = 4.71, p < .001.  Again, as with the results for the Restaurant 
Questionnaire, preference ratings did not differ significantly between those who reported a 
false memory and those who reported a false belief at either Session 1 (p = 1.00) or Session 2 
(p = .486). 
3.4.3 Food costs questionnaire.   
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As in the previous analyses, due to the unequal intervals between the options given, 
the data was treated as ordinal and the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis H test was used.  In 
this case, the difference between groups in terms of the amount that participants were willing 
to pay for their critical item fell short of statistical significance, χ2 = 5.93, p = .052.  
However, group differences were still in the expected direction with a mean rank of 44.13 for 
those who formed a false memory, 49.28 for those who formed a false belief, and 34.27 for 
controls.   
 
3.5 Implicit Attitudinal Consequences of False Memories and Beliefs (Believers vs Non-
Believers vs Controls) 
 Prior to analyses, reaction time data from the ST-IATs was prepared using the 
method of Bluemke and Friese (2008), which is itself similar to the D algorithm (Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) which is widely used in analyses for the standard IAT.  Initially, 
since the validity of implicit attitude measures relies on participants responding both quickly 
and accurately in order to facilitate response times via automatic associations, participants 
with error rates of 20% or more in any block of trials were excluded from analyses (a step 
which also helps to exclude participants from analyses who have either failed to engage 
properly with the task or failed to understand the instructions).  Trials in which an error was 
made were not included in analyses, and latencies above 3000ms and below 300ms were 
recoded as 3000ms and 300ms respectively.  The first trial of each block was considered a 
“training trial” and dropped from analyses.  Each individual latency then underwent z-
transformation, by subtracting the individual participant’s mean overall response time for all 
8 blocks of the ST-IATs (excluding the initial block of training trials) from each latency 
before dividing it by the individual participant’s overall response time standard deviation for  
all 8 blocks of ST-IATs (again, excluding the initial block of training trials).  For each ST-
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IAT, the measure of a participant’s implicit attitude towards the relevant object was 
calculated by subtracting the mean of transformed latencies in the ‘Food + Positive’ paired 
block from the mean of transformed latencies in the ‘Food + Negative’ paired block.  A 
positive score indicates that participants were quicker in categorising stimuli when the food 
and positive stimuli were paired together than when the food and negative stimuli were paired 
together, and thus is representative of a positive implicit attitude towards that item.   
ST-IAT results were initially compared between believers, non-believers and controls.  
Group allocation was based on the same criteria as those used in explicit attitudinal results.  
After excluding the 16 participants who registered a 20% or higher error rate in one of ST-
IAT blocks, as well as additional 5 participants who did not register complete ST-IAT scores 
due to technical issues during data collection, there were a total of n = 85 participants for 
these analyses; 42 believers, 18 non-believers, and 25 controls.  Believers registered a mean 
ST-IAT score of -.13 (SD = .34) for their critical item, whilst non-believers had a mean rating 
of -.36 (SD = .42) and controls had a mean rating of -.22 (SD = .37).  These means are 
displayed in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 6.  Mean ST-IAT scores for participants’ critical foods, split between 
Believers, Non-Believers and Controls. Error bars represent 95% CIs. 
 
A one-way ANOVA found that ST-IAT scores did not significantly vary as a function 
of group, F(2, 82) = 2.63, p = .078.  Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests did not yield any 
significant differences between groups (all p > .05).   
 
3.6 Implicit Attitudinal Consequences of False Memories and Beliefs (Memories vs 
Beliefs vs Controls). 
ST-IAT scores were also compared between the false memory group, the false belief 
group, and controls.  As in the previous analyses, 5 participants were not included due to 
incomplete ST-IAT data, and 16 were excluded from analyses due to high error rates.  Data 
were compared for 22 participants who reported having a false memory of the suggested 
event, 20 participants who reported a false belief only, and 25 controls.  Participants who 
reported a false memory had a mean ST-IAT score of -.01 (SD = .24), participants who 
reported a false belief had a mean score of -.26 (SD = .39), and controls had a mean score of -
.22 (SD = .37).  These means are displayed in Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 7.  Mean ST-IAT scores for participants' critical foods, split between those 
who formed a false memory of the false suggestion event, those who formed a 
false belief only, and controls.  Error bars represent 95% CIs. 
 
A one-way ANOVA found that ST-IAT scores varied significantly between those 
who formed a false memory, those who formed a false belief only and controls, F(2, 64) = 
3.44, p = .038.  Planned contrasts compared the ST-IAT scores of those who formed a false 
memory with the scores of those who formed a false belief and controls (combined), before 
comparing the scores of those who formed a false belief and controls.  Participants who 
formed a false memory yielded significantly higher ST-IAT scores than those who formed a 
belief only and controls, t(64) = 2.61, p = .011.  Those with a false belief only and controls 
did not significantly differ in their ST-IAT scores, t(64) = -.386, p = .701. 
4. Discussion 
The results of the current experiment regarding explicit attitudes are consistent with 
previous studies. In all explicit attitude measures that were taken pre- and post-suggestion, 
participants who formed a false memory or belief of loving a food the first time they tried it 
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significantly increased their explicit attitude scores for that item post-suggestion.  The only 
measure which failed to yield a significant effect was the ‘Food Costs’ measure when 
compared between those who formed a false memory, those who formed a false belief and 
controls.  This measure did yield significant effects when the data of those with false 
memories and beliefs (the Believers subgroup) was compared with that of ‘non-believers’ and 
controls, but when the Believers data was subdivided into memories and beliefs, the minimal 
differences between the two contributed to a lessened overall group effect.  This result, and 
the fact that the other explicit attitude ratings increased by similar magnitudes post-
suggestion for participants who formed a false memory and participants who formed a false 
belief only is consistent with the existing consensus that explicit attitudes are similarly 
affected by false memories and false beliefs (Bernstein et al., 2015).  As Bernstein et al. 
concluded, the driving factor in explicit attitudinal change appears to be belief in the event’s 
occurrence.  This is arguably also compatible within the APE framework (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006), in which explicit attitude judgments are said to be based upon 
syllogistic reasoning regarding judgment-relevant propositional information.  Therefore, 
whether the participant has a memory of the false suggestion event or whether they merely 
believe in its occurrence, this information may serve effectively identical purposes in a 
deliberative explicit evaluative judgment. 
The most novel and interesting finding from the current study, however, is that 
participants with false memories exhibited significantly more positive implicit attitudes 
towards their critical items than controls or those with a belief only.  This provides support 
for the prediction that false memories can affect implicit attitudes, but false beliefs alone may 
not.  This fits with the rationale that, like the guided imagery exercises of Blair et al. (2001) 
and Markland et al. (2015), the phenomenological qualities of false memories (sensory 
details, affective components, autonoetic experience, etc) may result in a change in 
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underlying associative activations triggered by presentation of the attitude object which 
would not be possible through a belief in occurrence without recollection.  This account of 
how false memories may affect implicit attitudes is consistent with the APE model of implicit 
attitude change, and also fits with the recent findings highlighting the strong cognitive 
similarities between memory and imagination (Schacter et al., 2012). 
The finding that implicit attitudes may be affected by false memories but not by false 
beliefs has implications for the dissociation of memories and beliefs in terms of their 
attitudinal consequences.  Studies investigating the attitudinal effects of false memories and 
beliefs have tended to group data from the two together and have stated that there is little 
difference between them in terms of their effects.  Bernstein et al.’s (2015) findings supported 
this, leading to the conclusion that the critical factor driving attitude change is not necessarily 
whether the false suggestion is remembered, but whether it is believed to have occurred.  
Whilst the results of the current study regarding explicit attitudes are consistent with this 
conclusion, the differing effects of memories and beliefs on implicit attitudes suggest that 
belief may not be a critical factor in implicit attitude change.  This is perhaps unsurprising 
given that the associative processes that form the basis of implicit attitudes are widely 
considered to be independent of conscious endorsement and are activated whether or not the 
individual considers them to be “true” (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  Therefore, 
assuming false memories are able to impact implicit attitudes through the same mechanisms 
as mental imagery, the individual’s belief in the memory should be of little consequence.   
It should also be noted that the false-feedback/imagination inflation paradigm used in 
this study was successful in eliciting a large number of false memories and beliefs; 70.7% of 
those who received the false suggestion later reported a false memory or belief of the event.  
A recent review of studies claiming to elicit false memories and beliefs of childhood events 
by Brewin and Andrews (2016) found the proportion of participants meeting the criteria to be 
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labelled “believers” in the analysed false feedback studies to range from 18% to 53%.  The 
large proportion of false memories and beliefs in this study may be a result of the 
modifications made to the standard false feedback procedure used by other studies (multiple 
potential critical items, personalised false feedback, and modified imagination instructions).   
Limitations of the current study include the absence of a baseline measure of implicit 
attitudes towards the critical item.  This was omitted intentionally out of concern that 
completing a pre-suggestion ST-IAT may have highlighted the four potential critical items as 
central to the study, and that this would adversely affect the credibility of the false 
suggestion.  The lack of a baseline measure means, however, that it is impossible to 
determine whether false memories changed implicit attitudes, or whether those who formed a 
false memory already had more positive implicit attitudes towards their critical items.  It 
should also be pointed out that it is unclear whether similar implicit attitude effects could 
have been elicited merely through imagination of the false suggestion without the need for a 
false memory.  Since all participants who formed false memories completed the imagination 
task requiring detailed imagination of the false suggestion event, and since those who formed 
false memories reported that they were able to imagine the false suggestion event 
significantly more vividly than those who formed a false belief only (p = .029), it is difficult 
to disentangle the influence of imagination from that of false memories.  However, those who 
reported a false belief did report a mean vividness rating above the midpoint in the scale (M = 
4.10), with those reporting a false memory reporting a mean of only 1.31 points higher (M = 
5.41); therefore, whilst statistically significant, it is debatable whether the two subgroups are 
likely to have differed in their vividness of imagination to such an extent as to be the sole 
cause of the implicit attitudinal effects.  One way that this issue could be addressed in any 
future research investigating implicit attitudinal effects of false memories and beliefs to 
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include an additional control group which merely imagines the false suggestion event, 
without it being suggested that the event ever actually occurred to them.   
Another limitation to be addressed in future studies would be the lack of complete 
randomisation to conditions.  Although the majority of participants (96 out of 120) were 
randomly assigned to either the Suggestion group or the control group, after a sufficient 
number of control group participants had been recruited, the final 24 were assigned directly 
to the Suggestion group.  This was because the subdivisions of the Suggestion group in the 
analyses means that a far higher number of Suggestion group participants are needed relative 
to control participants, and whilst it is highly unlikely that this partial lack of randomisation 
had any impact on our results, future studies should ideally maintain group randomisation 
random throughout.  Additionally, it would be beneficial for future studies to investigate 
whether negative false memories can result in negative implicit attitude change.  Whilst 
various studies have demonstrated negative false memories and beliefs having a negative 
impact on explicit attitudes (Bernstein et al., 2005; Clifasefi et al., 2013; Geraerts et al., 
2008), the question of whether negative false memories could similarly affect implicit 
attitudes has yet to be addressed. 
 
4.1 Conclusions 
The current study was the first to demonstrate that implicit attitudes can be affected 
by false memories, as well as finding supporting evidence for the explicit attitudinal effects 
of false memories and beliefs. The finding that false memories affect implicit attitudes but 
false beliefs alone does not contrast with the explicit attitudinal effects found both here and in 
previous research, which have found explicit attitudes to be affected to similar extents by 
both false memories and false beliefs. However, due to the lack of a baseline measure of 
implicit attitudes and only partial randomisation of participants, the findings regarding 
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implicit attitudes require replication in future studies.  This could potentially be done using 
multiple implicit measures; whilst the paradigm used in this study is able to demonstrate the 
convergence of multiple explicit measures, being able to do likewise with multiple implicit 
measures would be a good indicator of the reliability of these implicit effects.  It would also 
be beneficial for future research to address whether any implicit attitudinal effects are long-
lasting.  Previous studies have demonstrated that false memories and beliefs, and their 
explicit attitudinal and behavioural effects, can persist over time (Geraerts et al., 2008; 
Laney, Fowler, Nelson, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2008), although there is limited evidence to 
suggest whether the implicit attitudinal effects are likely to last.  As Markland et al. (2015) 
point out, implicit attitude changes brought about by imagery exercises are likely to be 
transient and would probably only last if the individual engaged in the mental imagery 
repeatedly and consistently enough to result in incremental permanent change to underlying 
associative structures.  It is plausible that this sort of change may be more likely through false 
memories than through mental imagery since a false memory (assuming it persists) is more 
likely to be repeatedly activated upon later presentations of the attitude object.  In addition to 
replication of the implicit attitudinal effects, it would be beneficial for future research to 
include longitudinal measures of implicit attitude to determine whether any effects are long-
lasting. 
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